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Table 1. MoD commands and military deployments
| COMMAND | LOCATION | DISTR/FLT |
LAND TROOPS / GROUND FORCES
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Moscow
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2000: ~322,000 pers. 01.2004 oper-mob trainings. 2004 Commander: A Gen Nikolai Kormiltsev. Head of Staff: Col.Gen A. Morozov. Fall 2006: 20 rgt, 30+bn level trainings with practical firings. 2004-2006 constructed 50+ garrisons for 24000 contract soldiers. Winter period 2007: 60 military trainings. 2007: 100,000 contract service soldiers, 60 units; 11000 trainings- 1100 bn, 26 rgt/bde exercises, 52- comd staff exercises. 01-05.2008 30 comd staff exercises. 09-10.2009 exercises Osen'-2009. 2009: 15 bde, 161 bn, 736 company exercises, 8000 firings. |
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• FAR EAST MILITARY DISTRICT
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Khabarovsk
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FE
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2000: 4500 tanks, 102 SSM, 310 combat helos, 500 combat ac. 12.2003 inspected by Head of GS Gen Kvashnin. 01.2004 staff trainings. 08.2005 "Peace Mission" joint Russia -China exercises. 09.2005 bn practical trainings, tactical maneuvres. 03.2006 comd staff trainings. 05.2006 rgt trainings. 02.2007: 30% contract soldiers, planned 12 units till the end 2007. 03.2007 rgt tactical exercises with firings: 2000 soldiers, 300 weapons systems. 06.2007 comd.staff exercises. 2007: 12 100% contract comds. 10.2007 arty trainings, comd staff exercises "Vostok-2007". 2007: 12 contract service comds. 05.2008 arty trainings. 08.2008 practice firing exercises. 01.2009 staff exercises. 02.2009 RCBW trainings. 04.,07.2009 field AD trainings. 11.2009 arty trainings. |
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83 SEPARATE CDO BDE
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Ussuryysk (Far East)
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FE
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635, 654 bns, 9 howz arty div, 111 tk bn (T-80B). 06.2004 ? company took part in "Mobility-2004" exercises in Far East. 07.2009 company took part in Peace Mission joint Rus-Sino exercises. |
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14 SPETZNAZ BDE
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Ussuryysk (Far East)
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FE
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incl 282 rgt (Khabarovsk, Volochaevskyy). 01.1995 one unit took part in Chechen war. |
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• LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT
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St. Petersburg
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Len
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Formed: 1864. 2000: 34400 pers, 1 airborne div, 2 arty bde, 2 mot bde, 1 msl bde, 4 ad bde, 1 spetznaz bde, 1 at arty rgt, 1 mlrs rgt. 320 tanks, 690 arty, 18 SSM, 52 combat helos. 03.2004 comd-mob trainings headed by CINC A.Gen Bobryshev. 08.2004 comd staff trainings. 04.2005 commanders trainings. 07.2005 visited by Norway MoD delegation. 09.2005 visited by US GF delegation. 2006: served 2300 women- 172 officers (73 lt col, maj). 04.2006 AD trainings.
08.2006 engr exercises headed by Engr Dpt Commander Maj Gen Yury Stavitsky. 07.2007 REGION-2007 comd.staff exercises. 04.2008 LVO CINC inspected commands. 08.2008 operative staff group took part in war in South Ossetia. 01.2009 RPG-7, AGS-17 complex trainings. 02.2009 comd staff exercises. 2009: serve 190 women from lt to col. 09.2009 LADOGA-2009 exercises jointly with VU. |
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2 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BDE
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Promezhits
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Len
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960 pers.08.2008 177 separate unit took part in war in South Ossetia. |
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• MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT
|
Moscow
|
Msk
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| |
2000: 82400 pers., 2 A, 2 tk div, 3 mot div, 2 airborne div, 7 arty bde, 1 mot bde, 3 msl bde, 1 spetznaz bde. 2190 tanks, 1490 ifv/apc, 1600 arty, 48 Tochka, 75 helos.01.2004 procurators conference. 07.2004 took part in "Union Security" exercises. 07.2007 REGION-2007 comd.staff exercises. 07.2008 arty trainings: 5000 pers, 1000 arty/mlrs units (Giatsint, Msta, Akatsia, Grad, Uragan). 09.2008 strategic comd staff exercises Stabilnost'-2008. |
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16 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BDE
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Tambov
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Msk
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relocated from Chukovo (Moscow). 370 separate unit took part in Chechen war, unit was destroyed in building exploded by rebels (losses: 35 killed incl. 14 officers) 14.01.1995. 13.09.2009 fire in garrison, 5 dead. |
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216 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BN
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Moscow
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Msk
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• VOLGA-URAL MILITARY DISTRICT
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Ekatirenburg
|
VU
|
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2000: 31700 pers., 1 A, 2 mot div, 1 tk div, 3 arty bde/rgt, 1 mot bde, 1 airborne bde, 2 msl bde, 1 ad bde, 1 spetznaz bde, 1 mlrs rgt. 530 tanks, 855 IFV/APC, 440 arty, 36 SSM Tochka. 12.2003-01.2004 inspected by Head of GS Anatoly Kvashnin. 02.2004 joint comd -staff exercises with Siberian MD. 04.2004 inspected by MoD commission headed by Land Troops CINC Gen N. Kormiltsev. 07.2004 took part in "Union Security" exercises.
03.2005 regional conscript trainings in Udmurtia.
09.2006 took part in "South Shield-2006" exercises: mobilized 3,500 conscripts, 20,000 soldiers, 5,200 weapons units; destroyed 5000 targets, shot 1100000 rounds, launched Tochka missiles. 03.2008 regional comd staff exercises. 04.2008 AD trainings. 09.2008 operarive tactical exercises Tsentr-2008. 02.2009 visited by MoD delegation headed by MoD minister on reformation of VU. 02.2009 combat readiness exercises. 03.2009 received 5 new div of 2S3M2 Akatsia and MSTA-SM. |
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3 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BDE
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Chernorech'e (Samara)
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VU
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1040 pers. 08.2008 one unit took part in war in South Ossetia. 02.2009 disbanding. |
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• SIBERIAN MILITARY DISTRICT
|
Novosibirsk
|
Sib
|
| |
2000: 2 A, 1 A corps, 2 tk div, 2 mot div, 2 mg arty div, 1 arty div, 10 arty bde/rgt, 4 mot bde, 1 airborne bde, 2 msl bde, 2 ad bde, 2 spetznaz bde, 4 at arty rgt. 4468 tanks, 6000 ifv/apc, 4300 arty, 36 SSM Tochka, 35 hel. 08.2003 staff commanders trainings. Head of Staff: Lt.Gen Vladimir Bakin. 09.2003 Military Drivers Conference. 10.2003 military delegation visited Mongolia. 12.2003 visited by MoD Head of Constructure Dpt Lt.Gen. Anatoly Grebenyuk. 12.2003 appointed 1st CINC deputy Lt.Gen. Khakim Mirzazyanov. 12.2003 bn commanders trainings. 01.2004 visited by MoD misiter S.Ivanov. 03-04.2004 comd -staff exercises near Baikal. 06.2004 visited by German military attache. 06.2004 commandres trainings. 09.2004 comd -staff exercises. 12.2004 delegation visited Brussels.
03.2005 MoD logistics inspection. 2005: served 4000 women (33 lt.col, 80 maj.,121 cpt (7 plat commanders)). 2005: Sib district owns 16000 real estate objects. 04.2005 inspected by MoD delegation. 17.05.2005 celebrated its 70th anniversary.
2005: avg officer age: 32; 70% officers has combat experience. 06.2005: regional comd-staff exercises in Zabaikal'e. 07.2005 "Strategic Magistral" trainings jointly with JSC "Transneft". 09.2005 regional rgt exercises. 2005: 130 tactical exercises.
03.2006 Div Commanders trainings, complex district trainings, "Buratino" firings. 04.2006 comd-staff exercises. 06-07.2006 took part in "Baikal-2006" military exercises, visited by MoD minister S. Ivanov and managed by Head of General Staff Y. Baluevskyy. 2006: 150 exercises; 6% conscripts has high education, 58% high school; constructed 1900+ apartments for officers. 03.2007 AD trainings. 05.2007 inspected by MoD delegation. 10.2007 took part in Vostok-2007 exercises. 2007: 250 trainings. 01.2008 one ad bde transferred to AF/AD. 04.2008 AD trainings. 2007: 250 exercises. 07.2008 comd staff exercises moto rgts. 2009: sgts will be studied at Omsk Tk Institute. 02.2009 arty exercises.02.2009 AD trainings. 03.2009 RCBW exercises, AD exercises. 03.2009 enlarged district exercises. 2009: 30 comd staff exercises, 1100 firings. |
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24 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BDE
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Irkutsk
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Sib
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02-04.1995 one recce group transferred to 324 mot rgt took part in Chechen war, fought near Gikalovkyy, Chechen-Aul. |
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• NORTH CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT
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Rostov
|
NC
|
| |
2000: 102800 pers., 1 A, 3 mot div, 1 airborne div, 2 arty bde, 2 mot bde, 2 msl bde, 3 ad bde, 1 spetznaz bde, 1 mot rgt,1 mlrs rgt, 2 at arty rgt. 628 tanks, 2100 ifv/apc, 855 arty, 18 Tochka SSM, 98 helos. 03-04.2003 comd -staff exercises (9000 soldiers took part) under the command of Head of GS. 03.2004 comd -staff exercises. 08.2004 comd staff trainings in Rostov district. 2004: 30 comd. -staff exercises, 50 tactical trainings, 1000 firings. 04.2005 counter terrorism comd-staff exercises. 06.2005: comd -staff exercises. 03.2006 took part in comd -staff trainings in North Ossetia. 07.2006 took part in military exercises Kavkaz Rubezh "to frighten Georgia". Estimated number of contract soldiers: 55,000 for 2008. 02.2007 comd. Staff trainings. 02.2007 GF MoD inspection. 07.2007 antiterror exercises KAVKAZ RUBEZH 2007. 11.2007 comd staff exercises. 2007: 2000 comd firings, 85 comd staff. 04.2008 AD trainings. 07.2008 rt commands trainings. Summer 2008: 140 tactical exercises (30% at night), >200 comd staff exercises. 07.2008 Kavkaz-2008 exercises. 03.2009 field arty trainings. 06.2009 Kavkaz-2009 exercises: 8500 soldiers, 200 tanks, etc. 07.2009 commanders trainings. |
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10 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BDE
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Mol'kino (Krasnodar)
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NC
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| |
formed 2003; 3,500 pers.
08.2008 unit took part in war in South Ossetia. Losses: 2? Killed. |
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22 SEPARATE SPETZNAZ BDE
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Aksai (Rostov)
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NC
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1692 pers., 25 BTR-80, 11 BMP-2, 11 D-30, 8 Grad.
1994 took part in Chechen war. 01.1995 unsuccessful descent operation headed by Maj Morozov: lost 2 (killed), 50 soldiers captured and de-armed by rebels, later transferred to Russians (Maj Morozov got under investigation of this event, result is unknown). 1996: 173 unit (included 3 recce companies, BMPs/BTRs, 6 AT Fagot, 6 AGS-17) fought for Pervomaiskoe (killed 85 rebels), Kizlyar. 11.1996 173 unit moved from Chechnya. Chechen campaign losses: 42 killed.
08.2008 some units took part in war in South Ossetia. Losses: 1?killed. |
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56 SEPARATE CDO BDE
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Mozdok/Volgograd
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NC
|
| |
ex 56 cdo rgt 20 mot div. 2009: 122 mm D-30 – 18, 2B14 Podnos – 18, ZU-23-2 – 8 |
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NAVY
|
Moscow
|
|
| |
2000: 161,000 pers. 4 fleets, 1 flotilla. Coastal Troops: 10500 pers., 811 tanks, 865 ifv/apc, 345 arty, 18 SSM, 16 hel,\BRAV- 133 arty, 8 ASM launchers, 50 ad msl launchers. 2004: took part in 11 joint Russia-NATO exercises incl 3 in North Atlantics, 3 - Baltics, 4 in Mediterrian. |
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• BALTIC FLEET
|
Baltyysk
|
BAL
|
| |
36,000 pers (18,000 Kaliningrad). Incl. Baltic and Leningrad Naval bases. 05.2005 visited by German Navy delegation. 07.2005 visited by Sweden MoD delegation. 2006: avg "open sea" time/ship= 5,5 days. 30-31.07.2006 visited by MoD minister Ivanov for Navy Day celebration in Kaliningrad. 07.2006: comd-staff trainings. 2006: took 2nd place of Rus Navy, won 5 pennants for successful trainings. 07.2007 REGION-2007 comd.staff exercises. 09.2007 fleet comd.staff exercises. 04.2008 inspected by NAVY staff. 05.2008 inspected by Polish MoD delegation. Contract sailor's salary: US$ 470-591. Phone +7 40145-3-21-80. 2008: ships made 17 visits, 20 msl launches, 500 arty firings. 09.2008 comd staff exercises. |
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COASTAL TROOPS (SIBV?)
|
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BAL
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09.2007 fleet comd.staff exercises. 11.2007 Staff disbanded(?) |
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561(4) SEPARATE SPETZNAZ PT
|
Parusnoe (Baltyysk)
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BAL
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42 HDRGR DISTR
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Kronshtadt
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BAL
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• BLACK SEA FLEET
|
Sevastopol
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BLS
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Formed 1783. Took part: 1787-1791 Russian Turkish war. 1799 attack Korfu (France), military operations in Italy. 1853 Russian Turkish war: destroyed Turkish navy. 1877-1878 Russian Turkish war. 1914 WW1. 1941-1945 WW2.
18,000 (2006: 13572 in Crimea, 31% contract service) pers. 04.2005: sea exercises. 09.2005 visited by NATO delegation. 03-04.2006 sea exercises. 08.2006: comd-staff trainings headed by Navy CINC. 08.2006 HQ visited by BLACKSEAFOR team. 08.2006 comd.staff trainings. 12.2007 visited by Moscow municipal delegation. 01-05.2008 154 sea firing exercises.08.2008 took part in war in South Ossetia, descent landing operations, blockade. During sea fight MRK Mirazh destroyed Georgian msl boat by AD Osa. 07.2009 KAVKAZ-2009 exercises. 2009: lt salary (complete): about $3000/month. 10.2009 Anti-sub exercises. |
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COASTAL TROOPS
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Sevastopol
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BLS
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10.2008 comd staff exercises. |
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431 INT SPETZNAZ PT
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Tuapse
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BLS
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# 51212. relocated from CAS to Kronshtadt then to Tuapse. |
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• PACIFIC FLEET
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Vladivostok
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PAC
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Formed 1860. Took part: 1863 assisted to northern states in Civil War in USA; 1904-1905 Russian-Japanese war. 1933 operations against Japan; 1945 war against Japan.
08.2003: comd-staff trainings. 12.2003 inspected by MoD delegation, Head of GS Gen A. Kvashnin. 04.2004 practical trainings. 08.2006: comd-staff trainings. 05.2008 visited by MoD minister.
07,09.2008 comd staff exercises, group msl launches. 30.09.2008 fire at PAC Arty storage. 2009: 130 course exercises, awarded by 5 (of 11) prizes of Rus Navy CINC. |
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COASTAL TROOPS
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Vladivostok
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PAC
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2004 commander Lt.Gen Igor Starcheus. Took part in military exercises on 08.2006. |
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42 SPETZNAZ PT
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Russkyy island
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PAC
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• NORTHERN FLEET
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Severomorsk
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NOR
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02.2004 strategic comd staff exercises Bezopastonst-2004. 2004: avg time of open sea trainings ("to be in sea") - 28 hours (surface ships), 30 hours for submarines. Its x2 more than previously, x2,5 times more missile.torpedo launches. 07.2007 comd.staff trainings. 06.2007 NOR CINC visited Norway. 07.2007 comd.staff exercises. 10.2007 inspected by Navy CINC. 2007: 80% contract sgts. 01.2008 visited by Dmitry Medvedev. |
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COASTAL TROOPS
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Severomorsk
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NOR
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2004 commander Maj.Gen Alexey Gordeev. |
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420 (?) INT SPETZNAZ PT
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Polyarnyy
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NOR
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• MIL ED CENTER NAVY (VUNTS VMF)
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SPb
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GS
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[crossreferences: member of]
GRU: structure
GRU: Main Intelligence Directorate
In October, 1995, a Russian government delegation, headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, signed a number of documents on developing Russo-Cuban cooperation. There would be no reason to call this fact noteworthy, if it were not for one small detail. All these documents -- on credits to continue construction on the Juragua atomic power station, on resuming arms supplies to the Cuban army, on supplying Cuba with oil and, on creating Russo-Cuban joint ventures in oil refining -- had one thing in common. Virtually all the credits offered by the Russian government to Cuba were intended to compensate Cuba for Russian intelligence's continued use of the Lourdes radio-technical intelligence station, which one of the members of the Russian government delegation called "a unique facility of Russia's national security system." And it is difficult to disagree with such a definition, since this station, located close to U.S. territory, is able to register, take bearings on, and determine the sources of the radio-electronic signals of the guidance systems of American strategic weapons systems, determine the patrolling patterns of atomic missile submarines, and intercept radio and radio-technical (including commercial) communications on American territory, in addition to many other functions. The characteristics of this station and the threat it poses to US national security are well-known to specialists, but only a rather small number of people know who the people stationed at Lourdes work for and who is given this top-secret American information.
Because, contrary to the widely-held opinion that this station is run by the successors of the former KGB, in real life, it falls under the jurisdiction of the most secret element of the Russian national security system -- the Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU] of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, about whose activities, little-known to outsiders, legends circulate among professionals. Thus, it is a rather well-known fact that the turning point in the Second World War and the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad were the direct result of the activity of GRU intelligence officers, who were able to learn that Japan had no intention of attacking the USSR. This made it possible for the Soviet Union to shift fresh Siberian divisions to the Volga, which routed Paulus' army. But few know that it was thanks to professional intelligence officers of the GRU that the "network" of so-called "atom spies" was created that gave Moscow the secrets of the Manhattan Project. The "Cambridge Spy Ring," one of whose main activists, George Blake, was under the direct control of GRU intelligence officers, also obtained materials of extraordinary importance. Also almost unknown to outsiders are such events as the GRU's direct participation in securing the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1961, the activity of GRU special operations forces [spetsnaz] in Afghanistan in removing [assassinating] that country's president on the eve of the invasion of Soviet troops, when the former KGB's special operations forces, dressed in Soviet and Afghan uniforms, almost bungled the operation by shooting at each other. According to one recent joke, if Aldrich Ames, "the last spy of the Cold War," had been run by the GRU, and not by the successors of the former KGB, he would have continued to harm US national security for many years, and would have finished his career, not in a Pennsylvania maximum-security prison, but in a dacha somewhere near Moscow. It is characteristic that Soviet military strategic intelligence, created in the 1920s as the GRU of the General Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, has not changed its name even once, in sharp distinction to its long-time competitor, political intelligence, which changed its name from VChK, to NKVD, to MGB, to KGB, and finally, to SVR.
The name was kept the same so that the hundreds and thousands of citizens of countries on the American, Eurasian, African, and Australian continents who had offered their services to the GRU could be confident that they were dealing with a powerful agency that would continue its work under any circumstances, in spite of any changes in the Soviet Union's political leadership and, indeed, in spite of the disappearance of the Soviet Union itself. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the short [1991-1992] period of subordination to the already-mythical CIS Unified Military Command, the former Soviet military intelligence was included in the military-political system of the new "democratic" Russian Federation, and became known officially as the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. To understand how this agency, one of the most powerful intelligence agencies in the world, worked and still works, all one has to do is turn to a world map, where it is not difficult to find the little star marked "Moscow" -- the capital of the Russian Federation. It is here, on the edge of the Central Airport, that the headquarters of the GRU, with its central apparatus and its support staff, are located, guarded more tightly than the lives of the country's highest military and political leaders. The GRU's structure is simple and effective, rather flexible, and quickly adaptable to the country's current military needs. In addition to the staff of the head of the GRU, the main intelligence-gathering units, the so-called Operational Directorates [operativnye upravleniia], are here. The First Operational Directorate of the GRU, traditionally, ever since the Second World War, called the "European" directorate, is responsible for conducting intelligence operations against the countries of Western and (since the beginning of the 1990s) Eastern Europe. The Second Operational Directorate, for just as long, has been called the "Asiatic" directorate, and is responsible for conducting intelligence operations against Central, South and East Asian countries, as well as the countries of the Far East, Australia, and New Zealand. The Third Operational Directorate is responsible for conducting intelligence operations against countries on the American continent and Great Britain, and the Fourth Operational Directorate organizes military intelligence activity against countries in the Middle East and Africa. These directorates employ a small staff of first-class professional intelligence officers with substantial experience working against the countries in their operational area.
Thanks to their efforts, the GRU's intelligence activity against various countries is organized, then carried out by the GRU's field office [rezidentura] or offices as, for example, in the United States, where there are GRU field offices operating in Washington and New York, with more being set up in San Francisco and Seattle. Operations officers in these GRU field offices carefully research the country against which they work, and seek to learn its most important secrets by recruiting persons who have access to information of interest to the GRU and are ready to sell it. Such work frequently ends successfully for the intelligence officers, who are thus able to penetrate into the "holy of holies" of the countries against which they are working. The information received from the field offices is divided up among the GRU's Operations Directorates by territory, and is processed by the so-called Operational Branches [napravleniia], which are territorially narrower in scope. For example, in the structure of the Third (American) Operational Directorate, responsibility is divided among branches which conduct intelligence operations against the United States, Latin America, Great Britain, and Canada. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, another Operational Directorate -- the Fifth Operational Directorate -- ran and coordinated the activity of the Intelligence Directorates of all the military districts, army groups and fleets, but in recent years, it has become the main organ conducting intelligence against the former union republics, which are now called the Newly Independent States. There are other GRU intelligence organs which work in close coordination with the units named above, including the First Branch [napravlenie], which is responsible for working against foreigners who visit or live on Russian territory, the Special Branch [napravlenie], which supervises the activity of military "illegals," the Special Center, which organizes special training of terrorist groups and the organs in charge of other forms of intelligence and reconnaissance, first of all, space reconnaissance, radio and radio-technical intelligence, communications, cryptography, and others. Each GRU Operations Directorate is supported by its own information directorate, where area specialists on America, Europe, Asia and Africa, and other regions work together with specialists on science and technology, strategic analysis, arms control, and much more. And the collation, analysis, and processing of the operational information brought in goes on twenty-four hours a day in the GRU Command Post. If one takes into account that GRU Headquarters also has a Personnel Directorate and a Directorate of Material and Technical Supply, and also a few small scientific and technical branches, the total number of people working at Russia's military intelligence center comes to a little over 2,500 people, or approximately the same number of people working at the headquarters of Russian political intelligence [the SVR] in Yasenevo. But to flesh out the picture, one needs to take another look at the map, on which Moscow is linked by the direct lines of communication of the Operations Directorates to the GRU's field offices abroad, located in their zones of operational responsibility. And if you draw a circle with a radius of several hundred miles, within that circle, you will see that the GRU also has at its disposal, both inside the Russian capital and a short distance outside it, scientific research centers, institutes, and laboratories, special training centers and camps, testing grounds, and even factories where special spying equipment is produced, all meticulously stamped "made in" the USA, Japan, Germany, and other countries.
The military strategic special operations brigades, known to almost no one, which are trained to eliminate, in a matter of minutes, the military and political leaders of other countries, no matter how closely they are guarded, to knock out the enemy's main, auxiliary, and reserve command points, to destroy the control centers and launchers of the enemy's strategic missile forces, the bombers which can deliver strategic and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, and to fulfill other more or less important tasks, are also stationed near Moscow. GRU specialists directly train and care for these brigades, which are always on the alert, ready for action as soon as they receive the command. But to take a broader look at the GRU, you have to turn to the map once again, where the Russian military districts and fleets are now depicted, each of them having their own Intelligence Directorate [upravlenie], which has several Intelligence Points, each of which has up to twenty professional intelligence officers, subordinate to it. These points conduct recruitment work among foreigners and Russian citizens, which could be used both in peacetime and in wartime in the intelligence interests of the front. The companies, battalions, and brigades of army, military-district, and naval special operations forces, which are officially subordinate to the Intelligence directorates of the military districts and fleets, in fact, get all their training, and material and technical supply from the GRU, which is the true boss of the special operations forces. Neither the SVR nor any of the other Russian intelligence services have such might at their disposal. And moreover, neither the SVR nor any other intelligence service has space reconnaissance, which is under the GRU's exclusive jurisdiction, nor air reconnaissance, nor radio and radio-technical intelligence, whose stations and posts, both on the territory of the former USSR and in other countries, leave no foreign military signals unnoticed, and can crack the intricate codes used by foreign governments to conceal their most sensitive national security information easily. Everything mentioned above is part of a single and strictly-centralized intelligence system, which is able to deliver intelligence information of a strategic character to the country's highest military and political leadership upon demand.
To think that the GRU works for itself alone would be simply naive, for questions of where military intelligence activity is to be directed are decided by the political leadership, not by the General Staff or the minister of defense. Having before it the tasks posed by the political leadership, the GRU collects, processes, analyzes and collates information on the country's most likely adversaries, their military and political plans and intentions, the condition of their armed forces, military-industrial complex, scientific-research work in the military field, and, in general, on everything which could be used to achieve military victory in the case of a possible or probable armed conflict in the future. Therefore, it is not by chance that when the highest Russian leaders speak about intelligence matters, they, as a rule, touch on the activity of the well-known successor to the KGB's First Main Directorate -- the present SVR, but almost never mention the subject of military strategic intelligence. Because it would be rather difficult for the same Russian government which tells the USSR's former political and military adversaries of its desire for peace, cooperation, and strategic partnership, and even a future alliance, to explain its support for the activities of the GRU, which, as always, is working with its eye towards a future war against those countries which Moscow today officially declares to be its partners and friends. The organization of this work, intended to help Russia in a future war, is, naturally, a rather complicated process, but it can be explained with concrete examples. Suppose, for example, that the radio-technical intelligence station in Lourdes, Cuba mentioned above takes bearings on "unidentified" electronic signals coming from the USA's East Coast. On the leadership's command, the GRU's system is immediately set into motion, and intelligence satellites are used to help define the source of the signal. Air and naval reconnaissance, whose ships and planes, disguised as commercial and research vessels, are specially equipped for this purpose, and are on constant patrol, are called in for assistance. As far as is possible, the GRU's agents, who can penetrate where radio, radio-technical, optic, laser, and other forms of radiation cannot, are also called in.
All of this information is then used to form an idea of what the "unknown installation's" purpose and capabilities are, which can later be sharpened, broadened, supplemented, etc., and reported to the country's highest leadership and used in the General Staff's plans for the possible destruction of this installation at the beginning of a new war. All in all, the GRU is a carefully-calibrated intelligence mechanism, able to carry out virtually any task the country's military and political leadership sets before it at any time. And today, the question of the practical use of this mechanism is not how it works in everyday practice, but to what end it can be used most effectively at the present time. For example, today, the GRU could devote its attention to local and regional conflicts to ward off future conflicts and localize existing ones or take part in the world community's efforts to fight international terrorism and organized crime. But to this day, there are no encouraging reports to this effect in the press, and, on orders of Russia's highest military and political leadership, the country's strategic military intelligence continues to work towards the same goal it had in the past -- to prepare Russia and its armed forces for a new war, although possibly in the remote future. Against whom--it is hard to say, but the target could be any one of the countries where its forward elements or field offices are stationed. And here, it doesn't matter whether the prospective target is, in the "near" or the "far" abroad. THE ALMOST UNKNOWN GRU by Stanislav Lunev, (c) 1996 The Jamestown Foundation
«We have a simple law: entrance - one rouble, exit - two roubles. It means that to join the organization is difficult, but to come out - is much more difficult», - here is the beginning of must be the most famous book about GRU - «The Aquarium» by Viktor Suvorov. Here is his GRU characteristic: Aquarium - is the central building of the 2nd Headquarters of General Staff, i.e. of the Intelligence headquarters - GRU.
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NOTE 11.2006: GRU got new hi-tech constructed HQ. see "GRU: structure" for photos.
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Military intelligence under various names exists from October 21, 1918. At that time the Read Army was already a large and powerful constitution. The General Staff - army’s brain - leaded the army. But the reaction of the Staff was deferred and incorrect because of the constitution’s blindness and deafness. Information about the enemy got from ChK (Emergency Committee). It is as if the brain got the information not from its eyes and ears but from the words of other person. And chekysty always considered the army applications as bye. It can not be otherwise: secret police has its own priorities and the General Staff - has its ones. The more information to the General Staff from the quarter - it always will not be enough. Let’s imagine - a failure must have happened, who is liable for this? The General Staff always can say that it has not enough information about enemy and so is the fault. And it always will be right, because the more information it’s collected the chief of the General Staff can set a million more questions which don’t have answers. That’s why it has been decided to hand over the military intelligence to the hands of General headquarters - let the chief of the General Staff command it: if there is not enough information about the enemy it’s a fault of the General headquarters itself... The main distinction from KGB and its Russian legatees is that GRU was and is a well-secret organization: - In KGB there are millions of volunteers, and GRU has none.
Here is the main distinction. GRU - is a secret organization. Nobody knows about it and so nobody enters it by his own initiative. But, let’s assume that there is a volunteer, he has find that door, knocks it and says: Would you admit me to?» No, he would not be admitted to. They don’t need volunteers. The volunteers will be arrested immediately and a hard, bitter investigation will follow. There will be a lot of questions. Where have you heard these three letters? How have you managed to find us? But the most important is - who has helped you? Who? Who? Who? Answer, the bitch! GRU can extract the veracious answers. The answer will be extracted from anyone. I assure you myself. GRU will sure find a person who has helped the volunteer. And again the investigation will begin: and who has told you these letters? Where have you heard them? Soon or later they will find the original. Itwill turned out a person who has been reposed by the secret, but whose tongue will exceed the set standards. Oh, GRU is able to extract such tongues. GRU extracts such tongues together with heads. And everyone getting into GRU knows about it. Everyone getting into GRU save his head and to save the head is possible only by saving his tongue. It’s possible to speak about GRU only inside GRU. It’s possible to speak only so that your voice would not be heard behind the crystal walls of the dome at Khodynka.
Everyone getting into GRU holy reveres the law of the Aquarium: «All we say inside let be left inside. Let none of our word get out of the crystal walls». And because of such order there are very few people who knows what occurs inside... Since that time when the book was published little changed in GRU. This intelligence still stays the most closed Russian special service - it’s the one which don’t have its own press service. So we should bespeak straight away: all information which is presented here can be outdated and incomplete. In the first place it refers to GRU structure which we can present only as a rough variant basing upon the data from the open sources. Korabelnikov Valentin Vladimirovich Chief of Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel-general Born in 1946. Graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy by MO USSR. Over 20 years work at the bodies of the Intelligence Headquarters (GRU) by the General Staff (GSh) of VS RF. 1992 – 1997 – first deputy chief of GRU GSh VS RF. During the military operations at the chechny territory went to a zone of military actions many times. In May, 1997 while the medical examination before the discharge of colonel-general Fedor Ladygin he was the acting chief of GRU. In May, 1997 appointed chief of the Intelligence Headquarters of the General Staff of VS RF. Former chief of GRU Fedor Ladygin taking up this post in 1992-1997 gave the following characteristic to V. Korabelnikov: «I had to participate the most directly in the fortune of Korabelnikov Valentin Vladimirovich and even to be the initiator of his - these or those - service advancements. He is a professional person of military intelligence, well-trained both theoretically and having large experience of practical activity in various spheres, including the operative work. As far as I know my estimations proved to be right in regard to colonel-general Korabelnikov. I think he leads FRU with dignity and successfully handles the set before him tasks». On Aug 20, 1997 entered the Coordination interdepartmental council on military and technical cooperation of Russian Federation with foreign states. Since Dec 31, 1997 - a member of Supervisory board over the company «Rosvooruzheniye» and «Promeksport» companies activity.
In July 1999 V. Korabelnikov earned honorific mention by the president B. Yeltsin for a substantial contribution into the process of conflict settlement in Yugoslavia region, Kosovo. On Sep 6, 1999 was incorporated into the Commission by RF President on points of military and technical cooperation with foreign states. Married. GRU structure * GRU chief is subordinated only to the chief of General Staff and to the Minister of defense and he has not a direct contact with politic leadership of the country. Unlike SVR director who meets with the president weekly on Monday, a chief of military intelligence doesn’t have «his own hour» - strictly fixed time in the order of the day for a report to the president of the country.
Existent system of «marking» - i.e. receive of intelligence information and analysis by the high leadership - deprives the politicians to direct approach towards GRU. GRU chief, deputy head of General Staff - Korabelnikov Valentin Vladimirovich
First department (agent intelligence) It has five departments each one accounts for its set of European countries. Each department has sections by the countries.
Second department (front-line intelligence) It includes 7 directions acting in the Western hemisphere:
First - controls tactics intelligence.
Second - leads agents recruiting and set agent’s networks.
Third - accounts for operations on detachments of special purpose in these countries.
Fourth (information) - information collection and analysis.
Fifth - answers for radio- and electronic interception.
Sixth - OSNAZ.
Seventh - accounts for communication codifying and security.
Third department (Asian countries)
Fourth (Africa and North East)
Fifth. Department of operative-tactic intelligence (intelligence at military objects).
Army units of intelligence are subordinated to this department. Naval intelligence is subordinated to the Second department of Naval Staff which in its turn is subordinated to the Fifth GRU department. The Department - is a coordination center for thousands of intelligence structures in the army (from intelligence departments of the districts to special divisions of the units). Technical services: communication centers and code service, computer center, special archive, service of business logistics and financial supply, department of planning and control and besides personnel department.
Sixth department It includes Center of space intelligence - at Volokolamskoye schosse, so-called «object K-500». Department leads the actions of OSNAZ - detachments of Special Purpose subordinated to the First and Second divisions of the Sixth GRU department. Their functions is radio- and radio-technical intelligence. Analysis and processing of the got by such a way information are allotted upon so-called «system Patrol (Dozor)» which is situated at the central building of GRU, Khoroshevskoye schosse («object K 200»). Sovinformsputnik, official GRU dealer of satellite photos trade Seventh department (answers for NATO). Has six territorial departments.
Eight department (work on especially marked out countries) Ninth department (military technologies)
Tenth department (military economy, military production and sales, economic security)
Eleventh department (strategic nuclear forces)
Twelfth department Administration and technical department Financial department Operative-technical department.
Decode service Military Diplomatic Academy (cant word - «a conservatory») located by Moscow metro station «Oktyabrskoye pole».
1st faculty. Prepares «coats», i.e. those who shall work under the embassy «cover» in residencies.
2nd faculty. Prepares officers of military attaches.
3rd faculty. Prepares officers of operative-tactic intelligence which distributed to the headquarters of military districts. About 200 persons annually graduated from «the conservatory».
First GRU department (production of forged documents) Eight GRU department (security of internal GRU communications) Archive GRU department Two NII (Scientific-research Institutes) Detachment of special purpose (Spetsnaz) 24 subversion and storm units of total strength up to 25 thousands persons present the army’s elite notably exceeding by level of training and armament the Military Landing forces and «the courtier units». Brigades of Spetsnaz - is a forge of the intelligence: a probation candidate to «the conservatory» should have a rank no lower than a captain and had to serve at the Spetsnaz for 5-7 years. Traditionally a numerical proportion between residents of GRU and KGB (now SVR) was and is as approximately 6:1 in favor of «pure intelligence».
* Modern structure of Intelligence headquarters by General Staff of Armed forces forms a state secrecy.
Presented here structure was compounded on the basis of Viktor Suvorov book and publications in press.
History of military intelligence Bodies of military intelligence: division of 2nd general-quartering officer of GUGSh Nov, 1917 - May, 1918 division of agitation and intelligence of Revolutionary Field staff by General Headquarters of Supreme Commander-in-chief Nov, 1917 - Mar, 1918 intelligence department of Operative department by High Military Council Mar, 1918 - Sep, 1918 intelligence department of Operative division (Operod) by Public commissariat on military affairs (Narkomvoyen) May, 1918 - Sep, 1918 Military Statistical division of Operative department by All-Union Headquarters (Vseroglavshtab) May, 1918 - Sep, 1918 Intelligence division of RVSR Headquarters Sep - Oct, 1918 Registration department of Field RVSR Headquarters Nov, 1918 - 1920 Intelligence department of Operative department by Field RVSR Headquarters Intelligence department of 1st (operative-intelligence-education) division by Operative department of Field RVSR Headquarters 1919 - 1920 Intelligence unit of Operative department by RKKA Headquarters Intelligence division of RKKA Headquarters Intelligence department of RKKA Headquarters 1922 - 1924 Fourth department of RKKA Headquarters 1926 - August 1934 Information and statistical department of RKKA Aug - Nov, 1934 Intelligence department of RKKA Nov, 1934 - May, 1939 5th department of NKO May, 1939 - Jun, 1940 Intelligence division of NKVMF 1938 - 1939 Intelligence department of General Staff by KA Jun, 1940 - Feb, 1942 Intelligence department of NKVMF 1939 - Intelligence Headquarters of General Staff by KA Feb - Sep, 1942 Department of force intelligence of General Staff by KA Sep, 1942 - Feb, 1943 Intelligence department of General Staff by KA Feb, 1943 - Jun, 1945 Intelligence Headquarters of KA (GRU NKO) Intelligence department of GMSh Intelligence Headquarters of GSh KA Jun, 1945 - 1946 Intelligence Headquarters of GSh VS 1946 - 1947 Committee of information (KI) by SM USSR 1947 - 1949 Intelligence Headquarters of GSh VS 1949 - 1950 Intelligence Headquarters of GSh SA 1950 - 1955 Intelligence Headquarters of GSh VS USSR 1955 - 1991 Intelligence Headquarters (GRU) of GSh VS RF 1991 - up to present time Bodies of Naval intelligence: sea registration service of Naval Headquarters sea agent (2nd, naval intelligence) division of Registration department by Field RVSR Headquarters Feb, 1919 - Jan, 1920 Fourth (Naval) division of Intelligence RKKA department 1935 - 1938 Intelligence division of NKVMF 1938 - 1939 Intelligence department of NKVMF Intelligence department of GMSh 2 GU MGSh RU GSh VMS Intelligence department of VMF USSR General Staff Intelligence department of VMF RF General Staff
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